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factual situation presents itself which would shock the conscience
of the court, the mutual mistake doctrine may be favorably invoked
to grant relief.
David Mayer Katz

Labor Law-Interrogation of Employee by Employer
as an Unfair Labor Practice
The NLRB sought enforcement of its order against D based
on its findings that two of D's supervisors interrogated employees
concerning their union activities in such a manner as to constitute
interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
Evidence showed that two of D's supervisors had on four occasions
during a two week period questioned four employees about their
union activities. One was questioned at his home and the others in
D's plant. D had no history of labor trouble or unfair labor practices,
nor was there evidence of anti-union activity. Held, enforcement
granted. The court held that the conduct of the employer's supervisors was of such a nature as might reasonably be found to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. A
dissent argued that mere interrogation in the absence of unusual
circumstances producing "coercive coloration" will not support a
finding of an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Harbison-FischerMfg.
Co., 304 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1962).
Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935 which guaranteed the rights of employees to organize and
bargain collectively, there has been a constant conflict between
these rights and the right of the employer to free speech. In the
NLRA of 1935 there was no provision for free speech by an employer. The National Labor Relations Board insisted upon strict
and complete neutrality on the part of the employer. It justified
its position by indicating the superior economic position of the
employer. In 1941, however, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the employer's right to speak as long as the speech was not
coercive. The Court stated that a speech is not necessarily coercive
if it pursues the employer's point of view, but it must be evaluated
in terms of totality of the circumstances. NLRB v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
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Congress in 1947 amended the NLRA and provided for the
employer's right of free speech. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1958)
provides, inter alia, that the expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion shall not constitute an unfair labor practice if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. This
amendment changed the problem from a conflict over free speech
to the question as to what constitutes "coercive speech."
The Board refused to recognize interrogation as an area of
free speech. Its position was based upon the idea that the questioning
of an employee concerning union activities carried an implied threat
and was unlawful. Standard-CoosaThatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358
(1949). However, in 1954 the Board overruled its prior position
and held that interrogation in itself was not coercive but could be
such when viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Blue
Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954). The Board's
finding in the instant case is apparently a return to the pre-1954
position since there is no evidence of any other anti-union activities
by the employer.
The majority opinion of the court in the instant case approved
the Board's finding that interrogation is "coercive speech" and is
illegal per se. Other circuits in reviewing the Board's decisions have
not gone quite so far without other evidence of anti-union activities
by the employer. In a recent decision the court in NLRB v. Kelly
& Picerne, Inc., 298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962), held that the impact
of interrogation on the employees determined its legality and the
facts did not show that the employer's acts would be interpreted
as coercive by the employees. Here, the supervisor had called one
employee on the telephone and asked about the union activities.
Later, the employee had gone to the supervisor's home where he
was asked the same questions. The court seemed to base its finding
on the fact that the employer had said nothing about action to be
taken by the employer.
In the Fifth Circuit itself, the latest case reached the opposite
conclusion from that reached by the court in the principal case. In
NLRB v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, Inc., 266 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.
1959), the court held that all interrogation is not illegal, but to be
illegal the interrogation must amount to interference, restraint, or
coercion. In NLRB v. Flemingsburg Mfg. Co., 300 F.2d 182 (6th
Cir. 1962), the court held that interrogation of employees as to
their membership in the union that is seeking to organize the
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employer's plant is not illegal per se, but must be considered with
the background of such inquiries, the time and manner when done,
and the surrounding circumstances to conclude whether such was
coercive. The other circuits take the same general view. NLRB v.
Lester Bros., Inc., 301 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Firedoor
Corp., 291 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1961); Bituminous Material & Supply
Co. v. NLRB, 281 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. McCatron,
216 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Tri-State Cas. Ins. Co.,
188 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1951); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185

F.2d. 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.
1948).
Some support might be given to the Board's findings and the
majority's holding in the instant case by the fact that one of the
interviews took place at an employee's home. The Board has held
in several cases that interviewing employees in their homes and in
places of managerial authority was sufficient to set aside a representation election. General Cable Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 573 (1957);
PeoriaPlastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957); Mrs. Baird'sBakeries,

Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 444 (1955). However, the mere fact that an
interview was held at an employee's home has been held by the
Board not to be a sufficient grounds for setting an election aside
where the interview was held two months before the election.
Sprague Electric Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 165 (1955).
The dissenting opinion in the instant case states that the
majority decision in upholding the Board's findings is "cutting new
ice" and is without much support. A survey of the cases indicates
that one would have to agree. Most of the circuits view interrogation
by the employer as privileged free speech unless it can be determined
from all the surrounding circumstances that such was coercive. The
effect of the decision by the court in the instant case upholding the
Board's finding is uncertain. Whether the other circuits will follow
this precedent in future cases remains unknown. However, the
National Labor Relations Board has apparently nullified the Blue
Flash Express doctrine, supra, and will hold in the future that
interrogation of employees about their union activities carries an
implied threat and is therefore unlawful.
Sterl Franklin Shinaberry
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